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The Korean Society for Journalism & Communication (KSJCS)
[ Article ]
Korean Journal of Journalism & Communication Studies - Vol. 66, No. 4, pp.72-106
ISSN: 2586-7369 (Online)
Print publication date 31 Aug 2022
Received 03 Dec 2021 Revised 01 Aug 2022 Accepted 20 Aug 2022
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20879/kjjcs.2022.66.4.003

일반인 제작 유튜브 정치 동영상에 대한 제3자 효과 연구

이선량** ; 김효정***
**부산대학교 미디어커뮤니케이션학과 neaptide90@gmail.com
***부산대학교 미디어커뮤니케이션학과 부교수 hyo.kim@pusan.ac.kr
A Study on the Third-Person Effect toward Citizen-Generated Political Videos on YouTube
Sunryang Lee** ; Hyo Jung Kim***
**Department of Media & Communication, Pusan National University, first author neaptide90@gmail.com
***Associate Professor, Department of Media & Communication, Pusan National University, corresponding author hyo.kim@pusan.ac.kr

초록

유튜브가 온라인 공론장으로 성장하고 있는 현 상황에서 본 연구는 일반인 제작 유튜브 정치 동영상에 대한 수용자 인식을 제3자 효과 이론을 기반으로 분석하였다. 서울에 거주하는 만 21세 이상 성인 300명의 응답 자료를 분석한 결과, 자신보다 타인이 일반인 제작 유튜브 정치 동영상에 더 많은 영향을 받을 것이라고 지각하는 제3자 효과가 나타났다. 또한, 제3자 효과는 메시지 바람직성을 낮게 평가할수록 커지는 경향이 있었으며, 개인의 정치 성향과 매체 정파성 인식에 따라 메시지 바람직성 인식에 차이가 나타났다. 구체적으로, 보수 성향 유튜브 이용자들의 메시지 바람직성 인식은 매체를 보수로 인식하거나 진보로 인식함과 관계없이 비슷하게 나타났고, 진보 성향 유튜브 이용자들의 메시지 바람직성 인식은 매체를 보수로 인식할 때 낮게, 진보로 인식할 때 높게 나타났다. 마지막으로 일반인 제작 유튜브 정치 동영상에 대한 제3자 효과와 규제 태도와의 관계는 통계적으로 유의미하지 않았으나, 제3자 효과와 미디어 리터러시 필요성 인식의 관계는 통계적으로 유의미한 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구 결과를 중심으로, 이론적, 실무적 함의를 논의하였다.

Abstract

YouTube has emerged as a solid search engine by distributing diverse types of information. The political area is not exceptional; videos containing political information have been on the rise on YouTube, and the general citizens have formed public spheres online as they created and shared political videos. This study focused on users’ perceptions toward citizen-generated political videos on YouTube, based on Davison’s Third-Person Effect (TPE) theory. The online survey was conducted with 300 Seoul citizens from age 21 to 69, and the result demonstrated the TPE. The respondents were more likely to perceive that the citizen-generated political videos on YouTube had a greater impact on others than on themselves. In addition, the respondents tended to show a high level of TPE when they perceived the messages were socially undesirable. Also, it was found that individuals’ message desirability perception was influenced by their political ideologies (conservatism or liberalism) and their perceptions of media partisanship (conservative, moderate, or liberal) toward the citizen-generated political videos on YouTube. Specifically, the conservatives showed a flat message desirability perception regardless of their media partisanship perceptions, while the liberals showed low message desirability perceptions when they thought the media was close to conservative partisan. In other words, the conservatives were not influenced by their partisanship perceptions toward a message when they judge the message was socially desirable or undesirable. On the contrary, the liberals tended to be influenced by their own partisanship perceptions when judging message desirability. Noteworthily, many previous studies verified substantial factors, such as ‘issue involvement’ and ‘hostile and favorable media perception,’ affecting the desirability perception of political messages. The result of this current study could be explained in a similar vein. First, the sample page of the citizen-generated political videos on YouTube contained political issues highly related to the government at that time. As the ruling party at the time of the survey was the liberal party, the liberal respondents may have been more involved than the conservatives. Also, the liberals may have been affected by the other factor such as ‘hostile media perception’ because 64% of them perceived the political videos on YouTube were close to conservative, 17% of them perceived them as liberal, and 19% of them perceived them as moderate. The imbalanced partisanship perception toward the citizen-generated political videos on YouTube may have affected the respondents to feel the media itself was ‘hostile media’. Finally, the current study examined the influence of TPE perceptions on media literacy and regulation attitudes. The results showed that those with the greater level of TPE perception were more likely to support the media literacy necessity. The association between the TPE perception and regulation attitudes was found not significant. That is, the respondents were more supportive of educating others on media literacy, rather than regulating the freedom of speech on YouTube. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings were further discussed.

Keywords:

YouTube Political Videos, Third-Person Effect (TPE), Message Desirability, Media Partisanship, Regulation Attitudes

키워드:

유튜브 정치 동영상, 제3자 효과, 매체 정파성, 메시지 바람직성 인식, 규제 태도

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by The Korean Society for Journalism & Communication Studies and Market Link in the process of data collection. This study is a revision of Sunryang Lee’s Master’s thesis(2021) at Pusan National University. 이 연구는 한국언론학회, ㈜마켓링크의 학문 후속세대 연구지원 사업에 선정되어 데이터 수집과정에서 ㈜마켓링크의 지원을 받았음. 이 논문은 이선량(2021)의 부산대학교 석사학위논문을 수정한 것임.

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